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 In October 2012 I conducted funded research at the Rockefeller Archive Center 
(RAC) on the recently opened Trilateral Commission (North America) records. I am 
particularly interested in the origins of the Commission and the role of those members who 
joined the Jimmy Carter administration in 1977. The research is part of a larger project on the 
origins of globalization during the Cold War and on the contribution of think tanks and other 
NGO’s on the definition of new goals in a rapidly changing world, which emerged in the 
1970s.
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Stories Yet to be Written: The Trilateral Commission in the Scientific Literature 
 The previous scientific literature which has dealt with the history of the Trilateral 
Commission shows two major limitations. The first is related to the growing influence of 
“conspiracy theories” associated with the Commission and other transnational NGOs. 
Furthermore, the studies that are based on more rigorous scholarly reconstructions are quite 
dated, because documents relating to the Commission have only recently become available.
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My project seeks to chart a new path, by attempting to enrich the traditional political and 
diplomatic history of the United States with the history of a Non Governmental Organization 
(NGO), in order to shed new light on an important period in the history of the United States.  
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Research Project 
 Between the late 1960s and the first half of the 1970s the U.S. military defeat in 
Vietnam, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the Watergate scandal, all 
undermined the consensus on cold war liberalism. Public opinion and U. S. policymakers had 
to deal with the limits of American superpower, which was no longer capable to guarantee an 
unrestrained economic expansion and an absolute anti-communist commitment as well. The 
demise of the butter and guns model produced a broad academic and social debate to define a 
new political agenda and to restore a wide consensus.
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 In the spring of 1972 David Rockefeller, inspired by the writings of Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, proposed the creation of the Trilateral Commission, where academic experts, 
economists, politicians and journalists from the three poles of the industrialized world—
North America, Japan, and Western Europe—could meet to discuss the major problems of 
the international system in order to improve public understanding of such issues through the 
support of the media.
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 According to the participants in the project, since the late 1960s the rigid bipolarism 
of the previous twenty years was inadequate to the challenges of a more interdependent and 
fragmented world. Instead of insisting on East-West confrontation through a pragmatic and 
unilateralist approach, the Trilateral Commission opted for a new agenda. In the first place, 
the trilateralists focused on North-South relations, particularly on the essential contributions 
of the “Most Advanced Countries” to the growth of the world “Low Developed Countries.” 
They also promoted more coordination between leading world economies, the development 
of alternative energies, and oil conservation policies. The tools for implementing these 
objectives were cooperation, multilateralism, and concerted decision-making within 
international organizations.
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 The democratic candidate Jimmy Carter joined the Commission from its onset and 
during the 1976 presidential campaign there was an intense sharing of information, especially 
about foreign policy and economics between the election committee and many trilateralists. 
After his victory, the new president tried to implement the so-called “trilateralist approach” 
by promoting North-South relations, a regional approach in local conflicts, renewed 
economic and political cooperation between the allies, as new priorities in U. S. foreign 
policy. By 1979 the escalation of tension in superpower relations, the Iranian Islamic 
revolution, and the hostage crisis, forced Carter to re-establish a classic global containment 
approach, failing to regain the public consensus against the rise of neoconservatives. 
 By focusing on the close connection between Carter’s foreign policy and the Trilateral 
Commission, my project hopes to provide a new and original approach to understanding the 
Carter administration. At the same time, I hope to evade the classic dilemma featured in most 
of the literature on the administration, which seem to rotate inevitably around the assessment 
of Carter as a “failed” president. 
 
David Rockefeller and the Origins of the Trilateral Commission, 1971-1973 
 
 The proposal by David Rockefeller to create a NGO designed to discuss the new 
issues that emerged in the early 1970s arose not only from the writings of Brzezinski and 
others. The organization would represent a harsh criticism of the Nixon administration’s 
foreign and economic policy, which aimed at a dangerous isolationism, contrary to the 
growing interdependence of the international system. 
 According to Fred C. Bergsten, of the Trilateral Commission: “In the summer of 
1971, President Nixon and Secretary Connally revolutionized U.S. foreign economic policy. 
In so doing, they promoted a protectionist trend which raises questions about the future of the 
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U.S. economy … In so doing, they have also encouraged a disastrous isolationist trend which 
raises questions about the future of U.S. foreign policy.”6 
  Rockefeller's commitment to strengthen relations with European and Japanese 
partners was also related to his business and financial activities, which benefited from the 
gradual opening of markets, and the intensification of capital investment and trade that 
affected the international system after the World War II.  
  More open markets that would go beyond the limits imposed by ideology was not 
only a simple business and financial strategy on Rockefeller’s part, but a deep awareness of 
the changes which took place in the international system, especially in the Third World. He 
inspired the creation of several organizations in order to expand and preserve U.S. 
participation in foreign trade, as well as provide technical assistance to the private sector in 
the developing countries. Rockefeller considered the South the new and most important 
challenge in the advanced world, which had to invest in the modernization of the countries 
that had gained independence. Hence, the U.S. had to be the engine of a historic transition of 
the international system.
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  The Nixon administration’s unilateralism and isolationalism led Rockefeller to follow 
with great interest the cultural and political debate that was emerging from the crisis of Cold 
War liberalism. As Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations since 1970, he knew many 
scientists involved in the analysis of the transformations of the international system. 
Above all, the books and articles written by Brzezinski and Robert Bowie led him to think 
about a new form of cooperation between the major powers of world capitalism, in order to 
tackle the challenges of the future by a multilateral approach. 
 According to Rockefeller, world leaders were not able to provide the public with a 
broad vision with long-term goals for electoral reasons. Instead, an organization of private 
citizens and experts not connected with political power could not only help to define more 
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accurately a strategy to address the problems by placing them in a more general context, but 
also inform public opinion in order to build a consensus on new goals and strategies. 
The members of this group would come from the most advanced countries of the world 
capitalism, Japan, Western Europe and North America. The group had to include experts 
from different areas as, i.e., universities, the press, entrepreneurs, and the environmental 
movements. 
 The proposal acquired greater consistency during a meeting held in December 1971 at 
the Brookings Institution, where some experts debated on the agreements concluded by the 
Ten in Washington on the reform of the international monetary system. From the meeting, 
attended by economists and political scientists from Western Europe, Japan and the North 
America, including Bergsten and Cooper, emerged a negative opinion about the agreements. 
According to the report published by Brookings in January 1972, the world leaders showed to 
be unable to make concerted and multilateral decisions in order to tackle common problems, 
such as currency fluctuations, trade, and relations with the developing countries.
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 In March 1972 Rockefeller gave four speeches in Chase Manhattan International 
Financial Forums held in Montreal, London, Brussels and Paris. Then in April, he attended 
the Bilderberg Group (BG) conference, held in Knokke, near Brussels, in order to convince 
its members to open the BG to Japan. However, despite the interest shown by the Bilderberg 
Group, the proposal was rejected because it was feared it would alter the Atlantic nature of 
the think tank. At this stage, Rockefeller  decided to found a new organization on a trilateral 
basis, getting the support of Brzezinski, Henry Owen, and Robert Bowie.
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 In the “Meeting on proposed Commission on Peace and Prosperity,” the name 
temporarily attributed to the new forum, held on May 9, 1972, Rockefeller met some experts, 
subsequently included in the Planning Group of the Commission, joined, among others, by 
Owen, Brzezinski and Bowie, who were engaged in the general definition of the goals and 
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structure. That meeting was the first of a series which, between 1972 and 1973, led to the 
creation of the organization through intense brainstorming.  
 On May 9th 1972, the planning group organized a new meeting which was attended 
only by U.S. experts and  academics. Rockefeller briefly presented his proposal, arguing that 
the new Commission had to deal primarily with economic issues, in particular the reform of 
the international monetary system and world trade. Brzezinski confirmed the importance of 
not giving a clear political orientation to the new organization, such as the Bilderberg 
Group.
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 The second meeting was held in Pocantico Hills, New York, on the 23rd and 24th of 
July. It was the most important meeting in the planning stage of the Trilateral Commission. 
Among the topics included in the preparatory documents were: the relations between the 
three capitalist poles and the communist countries, trade and monetary issues, the relations 
between the developed world and developing countries, the global impact of world 
population growth, the renovation of international institutions for debating, and solving new 
global problems. 
 The agenda also dealt with structure and membership of the commission. It was 
necessary to introduce the possibility of electing one or more Chairmen. The election 
procedures, the official language, the duties of the executive committee, and the budget for 
meetings and research were dimissed. The creation of a Planning Group and committees for 
regional meetings in each of the three poles and the establishment of appropriate 
subcommittees to develop studies to be discussed later in the plenary meetings were 
proposed. The duration of the committee was proposed to be three years with the possibility 
of renewal. 
 The Pocantico meeting was the most important meeting between those planned by the 
promoters and was also attended by representatives from the other two poles, Japan and 
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Western Europe. In his introductory talk Rockefeller briefly retraced his recent commitment 
to the creation of a NGO, considered the issues presented in the speeches of March and April 
in Europe and supported the conclusions that the Commission's main objective was to collect 
the best minds in the world to address the problems of the future.
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 At the final meeting of the Planning Group, held in Tokyo, between the 8th and 12th 
of January 1973 the Chairmen of the Commission were chosen, Takeshi Watanabe for Japan, 
Gerard C. Smith for North America, and Max Kohnstamm for Western Europe. During the 
meeting an Executive Committee was finally established that would meet two or three times 
a year, preferably after the meetings of the regional commissions. Brzezinski was confirmed 
as director of the Commission. Finally the first meetings between the Chairmen and the 
Director were scheduled in order to develop other themes to be proposed in the first meeting 
of the Executive Committee to be held in October.
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 In March of 1973 the Planning Group drew up  the final version of the Constitution of 
the Trilateral Commission. The document was divided in seven sections.
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 The first section, entitled, “Name, Nature, Purposes and Structure,” presented the 
main goals of the new organization, already enunciated at previous meetings of the Planning 
Group. The Commission was to be composed of about one hundred eighty members. Its key 
organs being the Executive Committee, the three regional Chairmen and the Director.  
 The second section defined the rights and duties of members and private citizens who 
could be invited by regional presidents to participate at the regional meetings or contribute to 
the preparation of a study, the Task Force report. In the third section members agreed that the 
Executive Committee, now composed of thirty-four experts, was the main political body of 
the Commission and after consultation with the regional Chairmen and the Director it had the 
right to choose the topics to be proposed and discussed.  
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 The Executive Committee had to partecipate actively in the drafting of the report, 
work with the three commissioners chosen as authors, and promote final recommendations to 
be included in the conclusions of the Task Force report. Executive Committee members were 
chosen by the regional Chairmen and in case of cancellation or subsequent abandonment, 
would have required a new appointment by the regional Chairman, confirmed by the 
Executive Committee. This organ of the Commission was to meet at least once a year at the 
request of at least two of the three regional Chairmen. 
 The fourth and fifth sections described the role and the responsibilities of the regional 
Chairmen and the Director, who had to be elected by the Executive Committee respecting the 
principle of rotation among the three regions. They would have to devote much of their time 
to the activities of the organization. The Director was the chief operating officer of the 
Commission and managed the relationships between the Committee and individual members.   
 The sixth section was devoted to the Task Forces, which were selected by the Director 
and the Chairmen, who, along with the commissioners, contributed to the drafting of the 
studies during special regional meetings in order to involve the largest number of members. 
The last section listed various procedures regarding the possibility of amending the 
Constitution, the exclusive right of the Executive Committee, and of the publication of an 
annual report, Trialogue, which synthesized the work of the Commission in order to involve 
and inform public opinion and the media about its activities.
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 The first Executive Committee of the Trilateral Commission was held on October 22-
23, 1973 in Tokyo. The conclusions of the final declaration of the Executive Committee 
argued that:  
Growing interdependence is a fact of life of the contemporary world. It transcends and 
influences national systems. It requires new and more intensive forms of international 
cooperation to realize its benefits and to counteract economic and political 
nationalism. This interdependence, especially among Japan, Western Europe, and 
North America, generates new problems and frictions which endanger not only their 
well-being but affect adversely the other regions. Although the risks of nuclear 
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confrontation have diminished, world peace and security are still to be given a lasting 
basis. New problems have also emerged to heighten the vulnerability of our planet. 
Humanity is faced with serious risks to the global environment. At the same time 
shortages in world resources could breed new rivalries, and widening disparities in 
mankind’s economic condition are a threat to world stability and an affront to social 
justice. Finally bear a special responsibility for developing effective cooperation, both 
in their own interests and in those of the rest of the world.
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 The phenomenon of globalization has its roots in the Seventies, and trilateralists 
understood better than others the profound changes in the international system, yet 
crystallized in the bipolar division. Until the twenty-first century, the disregard of the 
consequences and complexity of these changes is at the origin of the dysfunctions that 
characterize our present.  
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